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of all epidemiologists working in state and territorial
health department have no formal academic training in that
discipline. States reported that approximately 48% of epi-
demiologists work in infectious diseases (a figure that is
close to optimal), but that the rest of the public health dis-
ciplines, such as chronic disease, maternal child health,
occupational health, oral health, bioterrorism/emergency
preparedness, injury, and environmental health, are far
below optimal capacity; further, >60% of states epidemio-
logic funding support comes from federal sources. Most
states reported having an insufficient number of epidemi-
ology staff and resources to carry out essential public
health services.
In response to the training needs identified by this
assessment, CSTE, CDC, and Association of Schools of
Public Health developed a 2-year applied epidemiology
training fellowship that places trainees in state health
departments. CSTE hosted the first national epidemiology
workforce summit in January 2004 to identify strategies
for building epidemiologic capacity in the U.S. public
health system.
Infectious disease testing is one of the core capacities of
public health laboratories. Such laboratories play a key
role in supporting outbreak investigation and surveillance
activities. Public health laboratory staff must meet unique
requirements and posses technical skills that require a long
learning curve. Staff also need to have the knowledge of
public health principals and relevance of their work to pub-
lic health activities. Special recruitment and retention
issues are challenging the public health laboratory work-
force, including increasing vacancy rates and an increasing
demand for skilled workers in light of the Select Agent
Rule. At the same time, technology is changing rapidly,
with new tests emerging almost daily. Solutions offered
were salary parity with the private sector, innovative train-
ing, creation of interest in laboratory sciences, and contin-
uing education. The National Laboratory Training
Network has helped by offering courses, and Emerging
Infectious Diseases fellowships are also attracting new
workers. In 2000, Association of Public Health
Laboratories survey of state laboratory directors led to the
"Green Book," which forecasts impending vacancies up to
40% in certain public health laboratory areas. This finding
led to the development of the Center for Public Health
Laboratory Leadership, which offers corrective courses
and ventures.
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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is
first and foremost a pathogen of healthcare settings. It is
the most common pathogen associated with nosocomial
infections in the United States, particularly nosocomial
pneumonia and surgical site infections. It is also a frequent
cause of bloodstream and skin and soft tissue infections.
The percentage of S. aureus isolates resistant to
oxacillin/methicillin in U.S. intensive care units increased
from 30% to 40% in the mid-1990s to 57% in 2002. 
Data from a recent Duke Infection Control Outreach
Network survey indicate that of patients with healthcare-
associated MRSA infections, 39% were from nursing
homes, 37% had been hospitalized in the previous 90 days,
10% had received home health care, and 10% received
dialysis. Data suggest that MRSAbacteremia is associated
with an increased likelihood of death, longer hospital
stays, and increased cost of hospitalization, when com-
pared with bacteremia levels caused by methicillin-suscep-
tible strains. Increasing resistance to vancomycin among
MRSA also complicates therapy, which is already difficult
because of multidrug resistance among healthcare-associ-
ated MRSA. Because spread of MRSA in healthcare set-
tings is often clonal, hand hygiene and barrier precautions
are often effective in interrupting spread. Targeted surveil-
lance for MRSA is also a useful aid for infection control.
Data from the Duke network indicate that the spread of
MRSA can be curtailed in healthcare settings, given vigi-
lance and adequate funding of infection control activities. 
MRSA is now spreading in community settings.
Reports from the early 1980s indicate that patients in the
community without established risk factors for MRSA
(i.e., recent hospitalization, residence in a long-term care
facility, or dialysis) sought medical care with MRSAinfec-
tions. In the late 1990s, four children in Minnesota and
North Dakota died from community-associated MRSA
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β-lactam drugs, had pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) profiles that differed from typical healthcare-asso-
ciated MRSA, and contained the Panton-Valentine leuko-
cidin toxin. Prospective surveillance for MRSA in
Minnesota at 12 sentinel hospitals (6 in metropolitan areas
and 6 in rural areas) indicated that community-associated
MRSA patients were significantly younger than health-
care-associated MRSA patients and more likely to have
skin and soft tissue infections than respiratory or urinary
tract infections. A study in Texas showed that incision and
drainage of abscesses due to community-associated
MRSA was more effective management than administer-
ing antimicrobial agents alone, particularly since many
patients were given ineffective antimicrobial agents (i.e.,
β-lactam agents). 
Molecular analysis of the community-associated
MRSA strains showed that the methicillin resistance gene
mecA is typically carried on a much smaller genetic ele-
ment than is seen in healthcare-associated MRSA. Four
distinct elements, called staphylococcal chromosome cas-
sette mec (or SCCmec), have been described. In the United
States, SCCmec type II, which is approximately 60 kb in
size and also carries an erythromycin resistance determi-
nant, predominates among healthcare-associated MRSA,
while SCCmec type IV, which is only  23 kb in length and
carries no other resistance determinants, is typically asso-
ciated with community-associated MRSA. Three major
strain typing methods, PFGE, multi-locus sequence typing
(MLST), and staphylococcal protein Atyping (spa typing),
are used to study the spread of MRSA. MLST identified a
series of five major lineages (also called clonal complex-
es) of MRSA globally, while spa typing and PFGE subdi-
vide this group into approximately a dozen epidemic
clones. Virulence determinates for MRSA include a series
of enterotoxins, toxic shock toxin, and the Panton-
Valentine leukocidin toxin. 
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A range of quarantine approaches were used in five
jurisdictions heavily affected by the outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003.
Implementation of modern quarantine was resource inten-
sive, involved coordination of multiple sectors of society,
frequently required new legislative actions or authorities,
and was highly dependent on effective communication.
In Toronto, Ontario, Canada, quarantine ranged from
home quarantine with active surveillance to enhanced pas-
sive surveillance augmented by education about preven-
tion and a contact number to call if symptoms developed.
Healthcare workers were occasionally required to adhere
to “work quarantine.” New legislation in Ontario author-
ized compulsory quarantine with active follow-up for
compliance. Although 30,000 people in Toronto were rec-
ommended for quarantine, enforcement orders had to be
issued in only 27 instances. A comprehensive infrastruc-
ture was developed to support those in quarantine; masks,
thermometers, food, and financial assistance, as well as
psychosocial support, were provided. Should SARS return
to Toronto, the same measures would be used to ensure
that close contacts of infected persons are isolated and
actively monitored. 
In Taiwan, from April 28 to July 4, 2003, travelers
arriving from World Health Organization–designated
SARS-affected areas were quarantined for 10 days (level B
quarantine). During the SARS epidemic, 50,319 persons
who were close contacts of SARS patients were placed
under level Aquarantine; suspected or probable SARS was
diagnosed for 112 (0.22%). Atotal of 80,813 persons were
placed under level B quarantine; 21 (0.03%) of these cases
were diagnosed as suspected or probable SARS. The
strategies were later modified as understanding of the
infectivity of SARS increased, so that close contacts and
travelers from local transmission areas were required to
follow guidelines of self health management, including
isolation at home only when they had a fever. Fever mon-
itoring at international ports initially continued year-round;
its ongoing utility will be further examined. 
Singapore relied on effective quarantine of all persons
who had unprotected close contact with symptomatic case-
patients. Critical systems were implemented for quarantine
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